In an R&D-driven growth model with asymmetric fundamentals the steady state equilibrium R&D investments are industry-speci…c and they are such that R&D returns are equalized across industries. Return equalization, however, makes investors indi¤erent as to where to target research and, hence, the problem of allocation of R&D investments across industries is indeterminate. Agents' indi¤erence creates an ambiguous investment scenario. We assume that agents hold "ambiguous" beliefs on the per-industry pro…tability of their R&D investments. Investors'aversion towards ambiguity (in the sense of Gilboa-Schmeidler, 1989) eliminates the indeterminacy of the R&D investment problem. In particular, we prove that the asymmetric return-equalizing equilibrium is robust against a however small degree of investors'aversion to ambiguity.
Introduction
R&D driven growth models focus on the role of technical progress as the main source of economic growth. In this class of models, unlike the standard neoclassical growth model, technical change is said to be 'endogenous' as it is the outcome of R&D investment decisions taken by pro…t maximizing …rms. In the neoclassical model, where a perfectly competitive environment is assumed, the endogenous determination of the rate of technical change was problematic because of the di¢ culty of accounting for the cost of innovation. In fact, when the level of technology is considered as an input in production, the aggregate production function exhibits increasing returns to scale, which implies that total output is not su¢ cient to pay factors of production according to their marginal productivities.
Since the early 80s economists began to adopt Dixit-Stiglitz technology (or preferences) in order to develop general equilibrium models based on monopolistic competition and increasing returns. 1 Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 provided the …rst application in the …eld of international trade. Shortly afterwards, macroeconomics Yellen 1985a, 1985b; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987) and economic geography (Krugman 1991a (Krugman , 1991b followed. The introduction of monopolistic competition proved to be fundamental in economic growth theory as well, as it allowed creating the rents necessary to justify a costly research activity thus making endogenous technical change possible.
Romer (1987, 1990 ) produced the seminal contributions by modeling technical change as the increasing number of available goods (horizontal innovation). Anant, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) followed by developing models where innovation is aimed at improving the quality, or the productivity, of existing goods (vertical innovation).
Both models of horizontal and vertical innovation typically share a common threesector structure. The research sector produces innovations -or designs, or ideas-which are sold to the intermediate goods sector. Intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes, and each of them is associated to a speci…c design protected by an in…nitely-lived patent granting its owner the right to be the sole producer of that good: this sector is, in turn, monopolistic. Finally, intermediate goods and labor are hired to produce the …nal good in a competitive environment. 2 In such a framework, monopolistic competition in the 1 The so-called Dixit-Stiglitz preferences have been developed independently by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Ethier (1982) provided the …rst "Dixit-Stiglitz" representation of technology. 2 In fact, some R&D driven models are based on a two-sector structure where the intermediate intermediate sector is the key to the feasibility of innovation: pro…ts earned in that sector …nance innovation by paying for the cost of patents.
Dixit-Stiglitz technology in the …nal good sector can be described as Y = L 1 P N j=1 (A j x j ) , where 2 (0; 1), L is labor, x j is the quantity of intermediate good of industry j, and A j is an industry-speci…c productivity parameter. In the horizontal innovation case A j = A, and innovation consists of increasing the number N of existing intermediate goods. Since the marginal products of intermediate goods are independent of one another, the amount of resources (in fact a measure of capital) employed in the intermediate sector may escape the law of decreasing returns, provided it is spread across an increasing number of industries. In turn, increasing variety is a way of introducing increasing returns in capital and labor. On the other hand, when innovation is vertical, the number N is …xed and innovation consists of improving the industry speci…c parameters A j s.
R&D driven growth models typically focus on symmetric equilibria. Symmetry is to be understood in a twofold way. In the …rst place, it means equal size of intermediate goods industries. This notion of symmetry is common to both horizontal and vertical innovation models, and it is guaranteed by the symmetry of the economy's fundamentals across industries. In the …nal good production function, the cross partial elasticity of substitution between any two intermediate goods is the same: i;j = 1= (1 ) .
Furthermore, it is assumed that technology in the intermediate goods sector andin the vertical innovation case -in the R&D sectors is the same for each industry.
Symmetry in both cost and demand conditions, the fundamentals of the economy, ensures that equilibrium in the intermediate goods sector is symmetric, i.e. x i = x; 8 i:
Secondly, symmetric equilibrium indicates equal R&D investment in each industry.
This notion of symmetry applies to vertical innovation models only, as a horizontal innovation amounts to the creation of an altogether di¤erent industry. In this case, however, symmetric fundamentals are not su¢ cient to justify the focus on symmetric outcomes. The main structural di¤erence between models of horizontal and vertical innovation consists of the permanent versus temporary nature of monopolistic pro…ts.
sector disappears and where innovation occurs in the …nal (consumption) goods sector (see for example Grossman and Helpman 1991, and the model we develop in Section 2). The di¤erence in the structure, however, is more formal than substantial. In the two-sector models …nal consumption goods are aggregated into an utility index; the two structures can be reconciled by interpreting the utility index as …nal good production function, and consumption goods as intermediate inputs.
While in both models each monopolistic …rm is granted an in…nitely-lived patent, the monopolistic position of a …rm introducing a vertical innovation has a temporary nature as it only lasts until the next improvement in the same industry occurs. This distinctive feature of the vertical innovation literature, usually referred to as 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1942 (Schumpeter, [1975 will be indi¤erent as to the industry in which she devotes her R&D e¤orts provided that she expects her prospective leadership position to last equally long in each one.
We focus hereafter on the symmetric equilibrium in which all products are targeted to the same aggregate extent. In such an equilibrium the individual entrepreneur indeed expects pro…t ‡ows of equal duration in every industry and so is indi¤erent as to the choice of industry". Indeed, Cozzi (2005 Cozzi ( , 2007 shows the existence of multiple asymmetric equilibria triggered by self-ful…lling asymmetric expectations. On the other hand, the role of symmetric expected R&D e¤orts in the characterization of the symmetric equilibrium has also been questioned. Indeed, expecting the same amount of future R&D e¤orts across industries is not a su¢ cient condition for investors to choose a symmetric allocation of current R&D e¤orts: equal future profitability leaves the investor indi¤erent as to which industry to select when deciding R&D e¤orts across industries. As a result, under the assumption of symmetric expectations the allocation problem of R&D e¤orts is indeterminate. This indeterminacy in the distribution of R&D investment may generate multiple asymmetric equilibria, analogous to those identi…ed by Cozzi (2005 Cozzi ( , 2007 , each characterized by a di¤erent balanced growth path.
In two recent papers Giordani and Zamparelli (2008) case, equalization of returns leaves the agent indi¤erent as to which industry to invest in. As a result, the asymmetric equilibrium is not uniquely pinned down. In this paper we make the focus on the asymmetric equilibrium compelling. Our basic idea is that the agents'indi¤erence -arising from the equalization of R&D returns across industries -gives them in principle the possibility of adopting a whatever (even randomly chosen) investment strategy. This makes these agents highly uncertain about the con…guration of future R&D investment, since that con…guration is the result of a decision problem analogous to the one they are currently facing.
We assume that the agent's beliefs on the future (per industry) distribution of R&D investments are characterized by uncertainty (or ambiguity), in the sense that information about that distribution is too imprecise to be represented by a (single additive) probability measure. The traditional distinction between 'risk'and 'uncertainty' traces back to Frank Knight (1921) , and states that risk is associated with ventures in which an objective probability distribution of all possible events is known, while uncertainty characterizes choice settings in which that probability distribution is not available to the decision-maker. As is well known, the axiomatization of the subjective expected utility (SEU) model, provided among others by Savage (1954), contributed to undermine any meaningful distinction between risk and uncertainty. In recent years a number of attempts have been made to extend the SEU model in order to substantiate that distinction. 3 Here we follow the maxmin expected utility (MMEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . In representing subjective beliefs, it suggests to replace the standard single (additive) prior with a closed and convex set of (additive)
priors. The choice among alternative acts is determined by a maximin strategy. For each act the agent …rst computes the expected utilities with respect to each single prior in the set and picks up the minimal value. Finally she compares all these values and singles out the act associated with the highest (minimal) expected utility. According to this model, the agent is said to be uncertainty (or ambiguity) averse if the given set of priors is not a singleton. In particular, we use the "" contamination of con…dence" argument, recently axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki (2006) . In our framework the decision maker is assumed to maximize her expected pay-o¤ with respect to the R&D investment decision, while singling out the worst choice scenario, that is, the minimizing probability distribution over the future con…guration of R&D investments.
We show that a however small degree of uncertainty in the expectations of the future investment's allocation (an "" contamination of con…dence") eliminates agents'indifference and makes the con…guration where R&D returns are equalized across industries arise as the unique equilibrium.
Giordani and Zamparelli (2008) have proved that, in R&D driven growth economies with asymmetric fundamentals, a costless tax/subsidy scheme reallocating resources towards industries with more productive fundamentals raises the long-run growth rate and the social welfare of the economy. Since their results are based on the R&D return-equalizing equilibrium discussed above, establishing the robustness of such an equilibrium against the introduction of uncertainty in agents'beliefs improves the con…dence in the policy implications of the standard asymmetric model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
In Section 3 we explain the core of our argument, enunciate and prove our main result. 3 Seminal contributions in this respect are Bewley (1986) and Schmeidler (1989) .
In Section 4 we conclude with some remarks.
The Model
In this section we build a vertical innovation (or "quality ladder") growth model with asymmetric fundamentals. 4 Let us assume a continuum of industries producing …nal goods indexed by ! 2 [0; 1]. In each industry …rms are distinguished by the quality index j of the goods they supply, with the quality of their goods being increasing in the integer j. At time t = 0 in each industry some …rm knows how to produce a j = 0 quality product and no other …rm can o¤er a better one. In order to develop higher quality versions of any product …rms engage in R&D races. The winner of an R&D race becomes the sole producer of a good whose quality is one step ahead of the previous quality leader.
There exists a …xed number of dynastic households (normalized to one) whose members grow at constant rate n > 0. Each member shares the same intertemporally additively separable utility log u(t) and is endowed with a unit of labor she supplies inelastically. Therefore each household chooses her optimal consumption path by maximizing the discounted utility
where L(0) 1 is the initial population and > n is the common rate of time preferences.
The instantaneous utility function is a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas. We let the utility weights ( (!)) vary across industries, so as to represent a possible heterogeneity of consumers' preferences among the set of commodities. As the (!)'s represent the relative weights of the goods in the utility function, we can normalize them in such a way that
If we de…ne (!) as the size of quality improvements (the so-called "quality jump"), assumed to be industry-speci…c to allow for asymmetry in the technical evolution of each line, j max (!; t) as the highest quality reached by product 4 The model developed in this section is in many respects similar to the one in Giordani and Zamparelli (2008) , the main substantial di¤erence being that here we adopt the "TEG speci…cation" to capture the increasing complexity of the innovation process, in contrast with the "PEG speci…cation" adopted in that paper (see below for details).
! at time t, and d(j; !; t) as the consumption of product ! of quality j at time t, then the instantaneous utility function can be written as
and the static maximization problem can be represented as
where p(j; !; t) denotes the price of product ! of quality j at time t, and E(t) is the total expenditure at time t.
At each point in time consumers maximize static utility by spreading their expenditure across industries proportionally to the utility contribution of each product line ( (!)), and by only purchasing in each line the product with the lowest price per unit of quality. As usual in quality-ladder models with Bertrand competition in the manufacturing sector, this product is the one indexed by j max (!; t). As a result, the individual static demand functions are
Moreover, since the only j max (!; t) quality product is actually purchased, in what follows it will be
Substituting (4) into (2) and (2) into (1) we get the intertemporal maximum problem
where r(s) is the instantaneous interest rate at time s and W (0) is the present value of the stream of incomes plus the value of initial wealth at time t = 0. The solution to this problem obeys the di¤erential equation
Each good is produced by only employing labor through a constant return to scale technology: in order to produce one unit of good ! …rms hire l ! units of labor regardless of quality. The Bertrand competition assumption implies that the quality leader monopolizes her relative market and that the limit price she can charge is p [j max (!; t); !; t] = (!)wl ! : Thus the pro…t ‡ows in each industry are
Firms can engage in R&D to develop better versions of the existing products in order to displace the current monopolists. We assume free entry and perfect competition in each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns technology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. The R&D technology is industry-speci…c. In particular, any …rm hiring l k units of labor in industry ! at time t acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating A(!)l k =X(!; t), where X(!; t) is the R&D di¢ culty index. Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the speci…cation of the innovation process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation (or research intensity) is
where L I (!; t) = P k l k (!; t)dk. As R&D proceeds, its di¢ culty index X(!; t) is supposed to increase over time in order to rule out the "scale e¤ect" (Jones, 1995) , that is, to rule out explosive growth in the presence of a growing population. With reference to Segerstrom (1998), we model the increasing complexity hypothesis according to what is usually called 'TEG speci…cation':
where is a positive constant.
Whenever a …rm succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain stream of pro…t ‡ows that accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the …rm, v(!; t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D …rm is that of choosing the amount of labor input in order to maximize its expected pro…ts
The problem above provides a …nite, positive solution for l k only when the arbitrage
is satis…ed. E¢ cient …nancial markets require that the stock market valuation of the …rm yields an expected rate of return equal to the riskless interest rate r(t). The …rm's market valuation is v(!; t) = (!; t)
; that is, the present value of pro…ts discounted at the obsolescence-adjusted interest rate (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . Finally, the R&D equilibrium condition is
Since in each industry the market demands,
quire D(!; t)l ! units of labor in order to be produced, the total employment in the manufacturing sector is
5 The acronym TEG stands for 'Temporary e¤ects on growth'of policy measures such as subsidies and taxes. Useful surveys on the scale e¤ect problem and the way it has been solved are Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (1999 and 2003) . 6 We consider labor as numerarie and normalize the wage rate to 1.
As a result, the labor market-clearing condition implies
where R 1 0 L I (!; t)d! is the total employment in the research sector.
We now focus on the steady state equilibrium, where all variables grow at constant rates. Along the steady state _ E(t)=E(t) = 0 and hence, from the Euler equation, r(t) = : Moreover, from the de…nition of v(!; t) it follows that its steady state growth rate is v(!; t)=v(!; t) = n. By solving the system made up of (7) and (8), we obtain the steady-state values of expenditure E , and of current and expected R&D e¤orts L I (!; t) -which coincide in the rational expectations equilibrium -as
and
Notice that the steady state research investments are industry-speci…c and that, by construction, they equalize R&D returns across industries.
The Robustness of the Return-Equalizing Equilibrium
The equalization of R&D returns leaves the investor indi¤erent as to how to allocate resources across industries. As we have argued in the Introduction, this indi¤erence justi…es the assumption we make in this section, that is, the investors'aversion against uncertainty. We characterize the agents'R&D investment strategy, and we show that the return-equalizing equilibrium is robust against uncertainty aversion.
Importantly, our assumption on the agents'attitude towards uncertainty does not concern any fundamental of the economy and is to be interpreted as a way of treating the extrinsic uncertainty (Cass and Shell, 1983) associated to the future con…guration of R&D investments across industries. Moreover, uncertainty does not a¤ect expectations on the aggregate amount of research. In fact, we introduce uncertainty to eliminate indeterminacy arising from situations where agents are indi¤erent among a set of choices. This is not the case for the total amount of research: if agents expect the equilibrium aggregate amount of research, their choice between consumption and savings, which are channelled to the research sector, is uniquely determined and con…rms their expectations; there is no indi¤erence, which is the source of the uncertainty in the agents'beliefs.
Assume that the investor is (1 p)100% sure to face in the future the returnequalizing con…guration of R&D investment, and that with a however small probability p any other possible con…guration can occur. We can call this situation a "p contamination of con…dence". 7 Aversion to ambiguity in this context implies that with probability p the agent expects the worst con…guration of future R&D investment, that is, the one which minimizes her expected returns. 8 Since the minimizing con…gu-ration is a function of the agent's investment choice, this choice can then be formalized as the result of a "two-player zero-sum game"characterized by the minimizing behavior of a "malevolent Nature", which selects the worst possible con…guration of future R&D e¤orts and the maximizing behavior of the agent, who selects the best possible con…guration of current R&D e¤orts.
We denote with l m (t) + (!; t) the agent's investment in industry ! at time t, and with L e I (t) + "(!; t) the aggregate expected research in industry !, at time t. l m and L e I are, respectively, the agent's average investment per industry and the average expected research per industry. "( ) and ( ) represent deviations from the averages satisfying
The presence of the two functions ( ) and "( ) is intended to allow for asymmetry across industries both in the agent's investment and in expected research.
We can now state the R&D investment problem as 7 To avoid confusion let us remark that in the literature this situation is usually called " contamination (which is also the phrase used in the Introduction). However, as we will see, in our context " stands for the extension of the state space. 8 See the representation theorem (theorem 1) in Nishimura and Ozaki (2006) for an axiomatization of the choice behavior assumed here.
and where q(t) is de…ned as the expected R&D return which, with probability 1 p, is constant across industries.
In Appendix A we solve the maxmin problem above via the calculus of variations and characterize the agent's investment strategy as
and the distribution of expected R&D investments as
We can now turn to the steady state and enunciate the following Proposition 1 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)) from the returnequalizing expectations on the future R&D investment, decision makers adopting a maxmin strategy to solve their investment allocation problem choose a steady state investment strategy which equalizes R&D returns across industries. The values of these investments coincide with those in (9).
Proof. See Appendix B.
We have shown that, even under "( ) and p however small, the return-equalizing equilibrium arises as the unique optimal investment allocation. That is to say, even though the agent is 'almost sure'(p ! 0) to face in the future the return-equalizing con…guration of R&D investment (which would leave her in a position of indi¤erence in her current allocation problem), the mere possibility of a slightly di¤erent future con…g-uration (as captured by "(!)) makes her strictly prefer to choose the return-equalizing R&D investment strategy. This occurs because, whenever the agent evaluates any different allocation of her current investments, she will always be induced to expect the worst con…guration of future investments inside the "-generated set.
Concluding Remarks
The fact that R&D investment decisions are taken under conditions of severe uncertainty about their returns has long been recognized in the economics literature (see among others Rosenberg (1994) and Freeman and Soete (1997)): innovations are "unique" events, and the process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable economic activity. The concept of "Knightian uncertainty" (as opposed to "risk") appears to be essential in any attempt to analyze the evolution of the innovation process in modern economies. Recent studies on ambiguity (and ambiguity attitude) have tried to give an "operational" meaning to Knightian uncertainty. We have adopted the multiple-prior approach pioneered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
In particular, in a vertical innovation growth model with asymmetric fundamentals we have explored the relationship between ambiguity and extrinsic uncertainty, that is, uncertainty not related to the economy's fundamentals but lying in the current evaluation of R&D investments to be carried out by future investors. 9 We have shown that a however small degree of ambiguity aversion eliminates the indeterminacy in the R&D investment allocation problem. As a result, and in contrast with horizontal innovation growth models, the family of vertical innovation models can be meaningfully extended to more realistic asymmetric frameworks where the return-equalizing equilibrium is univocally identi…ed as the unique robust rational expectations equilibrium.
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Under TEG speci…cation
Moreover, as by di¤erentiating (7) with respect to time, we obtain _ v(!; t)=v(!; t) = _ X(!; t)=X(!; t), then v(!; t) (!; t) r(t) + (1 )
[L e I (t) + "(!; t)]
:
From the de…nition of probability p the return from any investment is industry speci…c (v(!; t)A(!)=X(!; t)) with probability p, while it is constant across industries with probability (1 p) (let us de…ne this constant value as q(t)). Then the problem is equivalent to
which admits the same solution as
Notice that this is valid for a however small probability p: Given these conditions, we …rst solve for the minimization problem
We set e(!; t) = R ! 0 "(s; t)ds; then e 0 (!; t) = "(!; t) 8! 2 [0; 1] and the minimization problem (P min ) can be expressed as
This is the simplest problem of calculus of variations. Since under the conditions speci…ed above G(e 0 ) 2 C 2 , we can apply the Euler theorem stating that, if G(e; e 0 ; !) 2 C 2 and e is optimal and C 1 , then e must necessarily solve
As in our case G does not depend on e, G e = 0, and hence (12) becomes (d=d!) G e 0 = 0, implying that
be constant with respect to !. Hence
where k 1 is a real constant. Now we solve the expression above for "(!; t) and obtain the reaction function of "Nature" to the agent's decision as
We can now plug it into the maximization problem (P max ) and solve for :
Rearranging, this problem becomes
Again, we solve P max as a problem of calculus of variations. By setting c(!; t) = R ! 0 (s; t)ds, so that c 0 (!; t) = (!; t), P max becomes
With the same reasoning as before,
where k 2 2 R + . From F we can derive the expression for (!; t) as
Plugging it into (13), we obtain
Now we can use the two conditions imposed by the constraints
to …nd the constants
Substituting (17) into (16), we obtain
Finally we can plug (17) and (18) into (14) and (15) in order to obtain the optimal pair (!; t), " (!; t) as (!; t) = (!; t)k 1 4k from which we can easily obtain expressions (10) and (11) .
B Characterization of the Steady State and Proof of Proposition 1
Expressions (10) and (11) prove to be relevant as soon as we turn to the steady-state equilibrium. Then _ X(!; t) X(!; t) i(!) = n and, as _ E(t)=E(t) = 0, it is r(t) = . It is easy to show, by substituting for L e I (t) + "(!; t) (as given in (11) Now, by using the arbitrage equation for any industry (equation (7)), we can solve for 
Dividing the market-clearing condition
by L(t), we can write
Given the absence of uncertainty on aggregate, and average, expected amount of research, then l The proof of proposition 1 is now straightforward. By plugging the mean value l m into expression (10) we obtain l m + (!; t) = l m (!; t)
Since by de…nition L I (!; t) L(t) [l m + (!; t)], steady state R&D investments coincide with those given in (9).
